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I. JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court took jurisdiction, initially, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78A-3-102(3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal1 for decision to this
Court, the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(4).
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED O N APPEAL

Issue 1 and Standard of Review:
Appellee moved for summary judgment on its affirmative counterclaim to quiet
title to certain real property. Did the trial court err in how it applied the respective
procedural burdens borne by the parties? The standard of review for that issue is
correctness. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, fflj 1 & 6, 117 P.3d 600, 601.
Issue 2.a. and Standard of Review:
Did the trial court also then err in quieting title in appellee, determining that no
title passed to appellant's predecessor in interest, via patent, in 1930? The standard of
review for that issue is correctness. Orvis, 117 P.3d at 601. ("An appellate court
reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary
judgment' for correctness.") (quoting Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, fl 8, 152 P.3d
312); see also, Harmon City Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1995)
("Because the propriety of... a summary judgment... presents questions of law, we
accord no deference to the trial court's determinations and review the issues under a
correctness standard.") & Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, at 1J10, 48 P.3d 235, 238
("We review the trial court's summary judgment for correctness, considering only
whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed
1

By order dated June 16, 2008, this Court consolidated CA-20080358 with this
appeal as both are from judgments in the same trial court proceeding.
1

issues of material fact existed.").
Issue 2.b. and Standard of Review:
Did the trial court err when it ruled that appellant could not assert the federal
statutory six-year statute of limitations defense to bar appellee's quiet title
counterclaim? The standard of review for that issue is correctness based on the same
case law cited as to Issue 2.a., supra.
Issue 3 and Standard of Review:
Did the trial court err in 2007 when, in spite of the parties' joint inaction since
the 2005 summary judgment ruling hearing, it dismissed with prejudice appellant's
claims and defenses based on adverse possession for failure to prosecute them but did
not also dismiss with prejudice appellee's counterclaim? A trial court's order dismissing
an action with prejudice for failure to prosecute is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109, H 15, 46 P.3d 753, 756.
III. STATUTES AND RULES O F IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
UTAH

R. CIV. P. 41(b). Dismissal of Actions.

(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or
to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of
an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court
without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for
a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render
judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for
dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper
venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the
merits.
///
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UTAH

R. CIV. P. 56(a) & (c)-(e). Summary judgment

(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of
20 days from the commencement of the action or service of a motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part
thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall
be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the
court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before
it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist
without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a
party failing to file such a response.
43 U.S.C. § 1166. Limitations of suits to annul patents
Suits by the United States to vacate and annul any patent shall only be brought
within six years after the date of the issuance of such patents.
///
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This case involves competing claims of title under federal patents to about thirty
one acres in Summit County, Utah. Almost eighty years ago, a regional federal land
office in Salt Lake City issued two certain patents, the Clegg mining patent in 1929 and
the Clark homestead grazing patent in 1930. Ownership claims arising from them have
come into conflict between Gillmor, who is the successor to the Clark patent, and Blue
Ledge, which is the successor to the Clegg patent, as follows.
In 1917, a person named John A. Clark applied for a homestead grazing patent.
Mr. Clark was married to Johanna A. Clark. After Mr. Clark's death, Ms. Clark was
substituted on the Clark homestead patent application. Between 1925 and 1927, a
person named Charles L. Clegg formally protested Ms. Clark's patent application in a
land office administrative proceeding. In 1929, the United States issued Mr. Clegg a
mining patent. In 1930- after and notwithstanding Mr. Clegg's protest to the Clark
application- the same land office issued Ms. Clark a homestead patent.
Appellant maintains that Ms. Clark was a successor in ownership to the United
States via her homestead patent. Mr. Clegg had six years to file an action to try and
annul the Clark Patent. Mr. Clegg never challenged the issuance of the Clark patent.
B.

Course of Proceedings & Disposition By Trial Court

In November 2005, a trial court of the Third Judicial District in the Summit County
Department denied Blue Ledge's motion for summary judgment as to Gillmor's adverse
possession claim and granted partial summary judgment to Blue Ledge on its quiet title
claim subject to the outcome of Gillmor's adverse possession claim. In deciding Blue
Ledge's motion for summary judgment, the trial court acknowledged that the evidence
4

raised unanswered questions about the parties' conflicting claims of right. Yet, the
Court granted Blue Ledge's motion. The trial court rested exclusively on an incorrect
legal presumption advanced by Blue Ledge that a patent that issues second in time is
void from the beginning. The District Court wrote on November 8, 2005:
"While the court would like to give a presumption of regularity to the 1930 [Clark]
patent, the court sees no possible benefit in making a factual determination
about the incidents of that day. Nothing could be provided that is meaningful, in
the court's mind, to the events of that day and why things happened as they did.
No witnesses should shed any light on motivation and meaning, and the court
believes the 1929 [Clegg] patent conveys title and it is unbroken to defendant
[Blue Ledge.]
DISCUSSION
QUIET TITLE
As to the motion concerning this claim of defendants, the court finds no
factual disputes that are material and judgment should be granted as a matter of
law to defendant.
The 1929 [Clegg] patent makes any further attempts at conveyance, or
any later patents of the same, void, ab initio. The statute of limitations applies
only to the United States or its successors, and is not applicable here. A
collateral attack on the homestead [Clark] patent is allowed by defendant. The
Court sees nothing but a legal dispute about the effect of these 1929 and 1930
patents."
®. 436-437)
So, in spite of an applicable legal presumption advanced by Gillmor- viz., that a
patent is presumed valid if issued- and in spite of evidence tending to rebut the
incorrect legal presumption advanced by Blue Ledge, the trial court resolved what it saw
as "nothing but a legal dispute" by choosing the legal presumption that led to summary
judgment and that essentially avoided an adjudication of the facts demonstrating
conflicting claims of right.
Neither party moved the case forward until, in September 2007, Gillmor
approached Blue Ledge regarding settlement and indicated that she would file a motion
5

to revisit the partial summary judgment on the federal patent conflict if settlement did
not occur. In October 2007, Blue Ledge's response to that settlement overture was to
file, under

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 41(b), a motion to dismiss Gillmor's adverse possession

claim for failure to prosecute it. Also in October 2007, Gillmor certified her adverse
possession claim ready for trial and filed, under

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 54(b), a motion

requesting the trial court to reconsider its 2005 summary judgment ruling. The trial
court denied Gillmior's motion but granted Blue Ledge's motion, dismissing Gillmor's
adverse possession claim with prejudice in December 2007.
In January 2008, Gillmor moved, under

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 60(b), for the trial court in

the interests of justice to dismiss both parties' claims since both had failed to prosecute
them, or alternatively, dismiss her claim without prejudice. The trial court denied that
motion. On March 21, 2008, the trial court entered a final judgment for Blue Ledge
from which this appeal lies. R. 645-647 & Addendum hereto.
C.

Brief Statement of the Facts of the Case

1.

The real property at issue in this case comprises portions of the surface

estate of three patented alleged mining claims. It is hereafter referred to as "the
disputed property." R. 359 & 396.
2.

In 1917, John Clark applied to the United States of America Department

of the Interior, within the regional Land Office located in Salt Lake City, Utah ("Land
Office"), for a homestead patent on land on which he had made entry, land that
includes the disputed property. Ex. A to R. 522-526.
3.

Between 1917 and 1926, Mr. Clark died and Ms. Johanna A. Clark his

widowed spouse was substituted for Mr. Clark on the homestead patent application. Ex.
A to R. 522-526.
6

4.

Between 1925 and 1927, Charles D. Clegg protested Ms. Clark's patent

application in an administrative proceeding before the Land Office docketed as "Contest
No. 4781." Ex. A to R. 522-526 & Ex. A to 536-539.
5.

The crux of Contest No. 4781 was Mr. Clegg's allegation of mining claims,

underneath the ground of the disputed property, that allegedly dated back to before Mr.
Clark's 1917 homestead patent application, specifically, alleged to date to 1916.

Ex. A

to R. 522-526 & Ex. A to 536-539.
6.

Ms. Clark at one point, but for a reason not apparent from the record of

Contest No. 4781 that is a part of the record of this case, conceded to judgment to at
least some part of Mr. Clegg's protest. Exs. A, B & C to 536-539.
7.

On May 22, 1929, the Land Office issued as to the disputed property a

mining patent to Mr. Clegg, the predecessor in interest of appellant Blue Ledge. Ex. C
to R. 332-352.
8.

On December 20, 1930, the Land Office issued as to the disputed

property the homestead patent for which Mr. and Ms. Clark had applied. Ex. A of Att. 1
to R. 358-383.
9.

Mr. Clegg never filed an action challenging the Clark patent.

10.

As part of a Judgment and Decree of Partition entered on February 14,

1981, in a partition action initiated by Edward L. Gillmor in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 223998, Frank Charles
Gillmor was awarded certain real property located in Summit County, Utah, which was
part of a larger parcel more particularly known as the Clark Ranch Property. The Clark
Ranch includes the disputed property, fl 5 of Att. 3 to R. 358-383 & Att. 4 to R. 358383.

7

11.

The source title document for the Clark Ranch Property is the Clark

Patent. U 6 of & Ex. A to Att. 3, to R. 358-383.
12.

The appellant Nadine Gillmor is the spouse of the since deceased Frank

Gillmor and title of the Clark Ranch passed to her in 1995 when Frank Gillmor died.
W s 1-3 of Att. 3 to R. 358-383.
13.

In 1983, the United Park City Mines Company (hereinafter "United Park")

claimed title to the surface of certain portions of the Clark Ranch by reason of mining
claims which Unfed Park held descended down from the Clegg Patent. Included in the
surface rights claimed by United Park was an alleged overlap of the Clegg Patent onto
part of the Clark Ranch. Frank and Mrs. Gillmor instructed Frank's attorneys, Hal
Christensen and H. James Clegg, to try and resolve these conflicts with United Park,
but a settlement was never reached. UH's 7-13 of Att. 3 to R. 358-383 & Atts. 2 & 4 to
R. 358-383.
14.

In each of the years from 1983 through November, 1995, the portion of

the Clark Ranch Property awarded to Frank was leased by Frank and/or Mrs. Gillmor to
others who used the property for livestock grazing. From 1983 through 1995, Mrs.
Gillmor visited the Clark Ranch Property each year during the grazing season and often
several times per year. As a consequence of these visits, Mrs. Gillmor knows that the
Clark Ranch Property, including the disputed area in the Northwest Quarter of Section
11, was all unfenced and open pasture and that pasture was grazed by Frank and Mrs.
Gillmor's lessees during each of those years. Mrs. Gillmor is unaware of any other use
under claim of right or title that was made on the Clark Ranch Property including the
disputed area in Section 11 during any of those years. fl 14 of Att. 3 to R. 358-383.
15.

In each of the years from 1983 through 1995, the Summit County
8

Assessor's Office assessed property taxes against the surface ownership on the Clark
Ranch Property, including the property on which the Clegg and Woodrow mining claims
overlapped. The property tax notices pertaining to said surface ownership of the Clark
Ranch Property were sent to Frank and/or Mrs. Gillmor in each of those years and
Frank and Mrs. Gillmor timely paid those property taxes. U 15 of and Ex. B to Att. 3, to
R. 358-383.
16.

In 1995, Mrs. Gillmor sued Blue Ledge Corporation for adverse

possession and Blue Ledge Corporation counterclaimed to quiet title claiming that the
Clegg and Woodrow Mining Claims voided the Clark Patent. R. 114-118 & 135-152.
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant Gillmor respectfully submits that the trial court has made several
decisions requiring reversal. In considering appellee Blue Ledge's motion for summary
judgment, it did not apply the correct procedural burden on Blue Ledge or accord
Gillmor the benefit of legal presumptions and reasonable evidentiary inferences. The
trial court also did not look to the correct federal laws in determining Blue Ledge was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law and Gillmor could not avail herself of an
applicable statute of limitations. Finally, when both parties had delayed the trial court
abused its discretion in dismissing Gillmor's claim certified for trial but awarded Blue
Ledge a final judgment on its counterclaim.
VI. ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HOLD BLUE LEDGE TO THE CORRECT
PROCEDURAL BURDEN IT WAS REQUIRED TO MEET TO OBTAIN PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS AFFIRMATIVE QUIET TITLE CLAIM.

Blue Ledge moved for summary judgment on its claim to quiet title. Blue Ledge

9

thus needed to "show both that there is no material issue of fact and that [it] the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 10, 117 P.3d
600, 602 (citing

UTAH

R.

CIV.

P. 56(c)(emphasis in original).

Where the moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant must
establish each element of his claim in order to show that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. In order to meet his initial burden on summary
judgment, therefore, [Appellees] must [have] presented] evidence sufficient to
establish that [quieting title in its favor] is appropriate under the facts of the case,
and that no material issues of fact remain. The burden on summary judgment
then shifts to the nonmoving party [Appellants] to identify contested material
facts, or legal flaws in the [claim that title should be quieted in Appellee].
Id. Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court did not hold Blue Ledge to that
burden.
Also, it is settled that "[d]oubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of
fact must be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment. Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the court before
judgment can be rendered against them unless it is obvious from the evidence before
the court that the party opposing judgment can establish no right to recovery. The trial
court must not weigh evidence or assess credibility." Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984)
(footnotes omitted).
A.

A STRONG PRESUMPTION EXISTS IN FAVOR OF THE VALIDITY OF THE CLARK
PATENT.

At the threshold of the trial court's inquiry on summary judgment, it was
confronted with the strong presumption in that the Clark Patent held by Gillmor is valid
in all respects. The United States Supreme Court has commanded that this
presumption be afforded to the Clark Patent, as being one of the variety of federal land
patents:
10

[A]ll the presumptions are in favor of the validity of the title, and in regard to
which a wise policy has forbidden that they should be thus attacked, and those
like the present, in which an action is brought in a court of chancery to vacate, to
set aside, or to annul the patent itself, or other evidence of title from the United
States, is very obvious.
United States v. Maxwell Land-Grant Co.et al, 121 U.S. 325, 379 7 S.Ct.1015, 1028
(1887)(c/f/ng United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61). In order to overcome that
strong presumption, clear and convincing evidence is required:
In either case, however, the deliberate action of the tribunals, to which
the law commits the determination of all preliminary questions and the
control of the processes by which this evidence of title is issued to the
grantee, demands that to annul such an instrument and destroy the
title claimed under it, the facts on which this action is asked for must
be clearly established by evidence entirely satisfactory to the court,
and that the case itself must be within the class of causes for which such
an instrument may be avoided.
Id. (emphasis added). Also,
[t]o avoid such 'solemn evidences of title emanating from the government of the
United States under its official seal' requires the observance of the early
established rule that it 'cannot be done upon a bare preponderance of evidence
which leaves the issue in doubt' even more than in suits between private
parties for such cancellations. Only 'that class of evidence which commands
respect, and that amount of it which produces conviction, shall make such an
attempt successful.'
United States v. Otley, 127 F.2d. 988, 995 (9th Cir. 1942).
B.

BLUE LEDGE DID NOT PRESENT UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE TO OVERCOME
THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE CLARK PATENT IS VALID.

Not only did Blue Ledge not offer uncontroverted, clear and convincing evidence
to overcome that presumption of validity, at the oral argument in 2005, Blue Ledge's
counsel effectively admitted that Blue Ledge could not offer evidence to explain why the
Clark Patent was issued that would establish any error in its issuance:
"We claim to have been issued a mining patent on May 22, 1929. We seek to
quiet title against a competing claim held by Ms. Gillmor, under which she claims
to have a right to this property pursuant to a grazing patent that was issued on
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December 20, 1930.
We have a hunch that the reason this becomes an issue dates back to 1929
when my client received a mining patent... . In that patent the property was
described by a metes and bounds description. What should have happened at
that point is that the federal surveyor should have gone back to the map, and
should have drawn in the land that had been patented to [Blue Ledge's
predecessor in interest].

In 1930, about a year and a half after my client's predecessor had received its
mining patent... a woman named Johanna Clark received a grazing homestead
patent from the federal government for what was known as the 'Clark Ranch.'...
We think that what happened is that the surveyor had not gone back in the
meantime, after my client's predecessor received its mining patent, because it
was by metes and bounds. If you look at the patent my client's predecessor
received, it's a hairy list of metes and bounds descriptions and they didn't go
back- the surveyor didn't go back immediately and plot all that on the map. So
in 1930, when the government went to give Johanna Clark her grazing
patent, which is for the surface estate only, they goofed, because the mining
patent hadn't been plotted on the map."2
The Land Office issued the Clark Patent only a year after it issued the Clegg Patent.
Blue Ledge's "guess" is that the land office "goofed," perhaps because the Clegg Patent
was not clearly described. Blue Ledge's guesswork, however, is plainly insufficient to
overcome the strong presumption in favor of validity of the Clark Patent and therefore
Blue Ledge can in no way be entitled to judgment as a matter of law on summary
judgment. "[T]he party opposing summary judgment is entitled to the benefit of 'all
applicable presumptions, inferences and intendments... .'" Med-Trust Reinsurance Co.
Ltd. v. U.S., 37 Fed. CI 428, 434 (1997) (quoting H.F. Allen Orchards v. U.S., 749 F.2d
1571, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see also, Massey, 2007 UT 10, U 8, 152 P.3d at 314-315
(Utah Supreme Court held summary judgment movants were entitled to quiet title only
because they had presented evidence to successfully rebut and thus overcome the

2

R. 627 at 2-4.
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statutory legal presumption of tax deed validity resting with non-movant).
Mr. Clegg had formally protested Ms. Clark's patent application at the Land
Office, but the Land Office issued the Clark Patent anyway. In 1928 the Land Office
ruled that Ms. Clark's homestead entry was "to the extent of the conflict hereby
cancelled." However, that ruling begs the question of whether there was any "conflict"
between the two patents. No evidence whatsoever was presented on that point by Blue
Ledge and no evidence whatsoever was presented to explain why the Land Office
concluded that it could issue lawfully both the Clark Patent and the Clegg Patent for the
same ground.
Blue Ledge conceded, as it had to since it had no evidence to present, it simply
did not know what happened between 1928 and 1930 to explain why both patents
issued on the heels of Mr. Clegg's protest. Blue Ledge has never given answers or
produced evidence or Land Office records that could possibly have carried its burden
on summary judgment if the trial court had applied the parties' respective burdens
properly. According to Blue Ledge's counsel, the Clark family and Mr. Clegg had been
fighting against each other over land in the 1920's, Ms. Clark "confessed judgment" to
Mr Clegg's protest but nevertheless "[w]e don't know what happened" after that and "[i]t
looks like somebody made a clerical error."
Since, even if Ms. Clark at one point in the Land Office proceeding conceded to
Mr. Clegg's protest and the Land Office canceled her homestead entry to the extent it
"conflicted" with the Clegg Patent, the Land Office's proceeded to issue the Clark
Patent, it is reasonable to infer that the Land Office's action was based on its finding
that no "conflict" would exist between the two patents, even though they encompassed
the same land. Gillmor was not required to explain or come forward with any, let alone
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further, evidence sustaining the validity of the Clark Patent. Nevertheless, Gillmor's
counsel argued to the trial court the implausibility that the Land Office would engage in
a meaningless and nugatory act, versus the plausibility that the Land Office ultimately
adjudicated that it had something valid to convey to Ms. Clark. Furthermore, especially
in light of Mr. Clegg's protest, it is plausible to infer that the Land Office would only have
issued the Clark Patent if doing so was going to be in harmony with the Clegg Patent it
had issued one year before.
That argument posited to the trial court by Gillmor's counsel is supported by the
Clark Patent itself. The Clark Patent contains the following language:
"Excepting and reserving, however, to the United States all the coal and other
minerals in the lands so entered and patented, together with the right to prospect
for, mine, and remove the same pursuant to the provisions and limitations of the
Act of December 29, 1916 (39 Stat., 862)."
Ex. A of Att. 1 to R. 358-383. The Clark Patent was issued, by its plain reference,
under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act ("SRHA") of 1916. Id. Like every homestead
patent that issued at the time, the Clark Patent contained the SRHA-required
reservation "to the United States 'all the coal and other minerals' in the land." Watt v.
Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 37-40, 130 S Ct 2218, 76 L.Ed 2d 400 (1983)
(quoting SRHA); see also Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 505-506, 48
S.Ct 580, 72 L.Ed 961 (1928)(equity suit by oil and gas leaseholder to enjoin
homestead patentee from surface use incompatible with continued mining operations
proper because lease included implied right to reasonably necessary surface use but
not proper to cancel homestead patent for same land); Sunrise Valley, LLC .v.
Kempthorne, 528 F.3d 1251, 1253 (10th Cir. May 20, 2008) (quoting Watt)
(congressional purpose reserving mineral rights under SRHA was "to facilitate the
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concurrent development of both surface and subsurface resources" because "ranching
and farming do not ordinarily entail the extraction of mineral substances," and surface
lands were patented "chiefly... for grazing and raising forage crops... for the support of a
family"); Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 1988). There is in
fact a reasonable explanation for the issuance of the two patents, therefore, and that is
that they do not conflict. The Land Office plainly determined to grant Ms. Clark all of
the surface rights in the land except those reasonably necessary for mining under the
mineral rights the United States reserved to itself. Having reserved the mining rights to
itself in the Clark Patent, the United States saw fit to grant those mineral rights to Mr.
Clegg. But Mr. Clegg would be limited in his use of the surface to those activities
reasonably related to the reserved mineral rights the United States granted him. That
explanation was rejected by the trial court without any evidence to support its rejection.
This is a perfectly reasonable interpretation, entirely consistent with the express
language of the Clark Patent, entirely consistent with the express language of the
statute referenced in the Clark Patent and entirely likely given the Congressional
mandate to the Land Office. Blue Ledge offered no evidence to refute this reasonable
explanation and so failed in its burden on summary judgment.
"Under this rule

[UTAH

R. CIV. P. 56], it is clear that if there is any genuine issue

as to any material fact, the motion should be denied." Young v Felornia, 244 P.2d 862,
863 (Utah 1952). "On summary judgment the adverse party is entitled to have the court
survey the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to him." Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 395 P.2d 62, 63 (Utah
1964).
Ill
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C.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT LOOK TO FEDERAL LAW IN DETERMINING
WHETHER BLUE LEDGE WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The trial court seemed to look solely to the date of issuance of the federal
patents as a fact dispositive of whether the United States held any interest it could grant
to Clark after the Clegg Patent was issued. That overlooked Gillmor's counsel's
argument of the applicable federal law to the trial court, that Blue Ledge had the burden
to "go back to the dates of the application^]... [and] the land office records, to show [the
trial court] that the land office did not know what it was doing when it issued the Clark
Patent, or that the Clark Patent was in fact not first in right, even though it was issued
second in time." R. 000426 at 14-15. The ultimate question of whether any federal
patent, Clark's or Clegg's or anyone else's, is thus not answered by resort to applying
state law recording principles, which was the argument presented by Blue Ledge.
R.340-342. . See generally, Proctor v. Painter, 15 F.2d 974, 975 (9th Cir. 1926)("The
question whether a patent from the United States for public lands is valid or invalid is
not always one of easy solution" but evidence showed that the land office did not have
jurisdiction to dispose of land and issue patent therefor).
The trial court focused exclusively and therefore erroneously on the fact that the
date of issuance of the Clegg Patent predated the date of issuance of the Clark Patent.
In its citation to federal law, Blue Ledge relied exclusively on Proctor, and a string
citation in Proctor's to support the argument that "[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved or
appropriated are absolutely void." 15 F.2d at 975 (citations omitted).3 Blue Ledge
failed to explain, however, what the Supreme Court's use of the phrase "reserved or
3

R. 000627 at 5.
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appropriated" meant. In fact, federal law is clear that the date of "issuance" or "grant" is
emphatically not what determines either the validity or scope of a patent that has
issued. Instead, the date that an applicant's claim of right arose in favor of the patent
application is determinative. See United States v. Etcheverry, 230 F.2d 193, 196 (9th
Cir. 1956)(citing cases). Proctor's use of the phrase "absolutely void" which was
highlighted by Blue Ledge was plainly a reference to patents which had been subjected
to an evidentiary showing that the lands claimed by the void patent had been
"previously granted, reserved or appropriated."
In the portion of the Proctor decision Blue Ledge omitted to bring to the trial
court's attention, which immediately followed the portion of the opinion Blue Ledge
quoted, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[o]n the other hand, if the Land Department has
jurisdiction to dispose of the land and to issue a patent therefor, an erroneous
determination of the facts upon which the right to a patent depends, or an entire
failure to determine such facts, will not avoid the patent Id. (citing Burke v.
Southern Pacific R. Co., 234 U.S. 669, 34 S. Ct. 907, 58 L. Ed. 1527)(emphasis
added). Applying that statement of law to this case, since the Land Office ultimately
determined that the Clark Patent should issue- whether because her application or her
claim of right preceded the claim of right of Clegg, or for some other reason not known
to Gillmor, Blue Ledge or the trial court, the Clark Patent was found not to conflict with
the Clegg Patent in the eyes of the Land Office. The Land Office is the administrative
agency with jurisdiction to make such determinations. The Clark Patent reserved
mineral rights and the Clegg Patent granted mineral rights. Clearly, Blue Ledge did not
meet its burden under federal law to show that the Clark Patent would be void in the
circumstances.
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Given that Mr. Clegg had protested the Clark homestead application but the Land
Office issued the Clark Patent anyway, it is at least possible that the Land Office
intended the Clark Patent to be superior to the Clegg Patent, because there is case law
that, when a patent issues, the title and claim of right that comes with the patent relates
back to the date of the entry on the land. Etcheverry, 230 F.2d at 196 ("A patent from
the United States operates to transfer the title, not merely from the date of the
patent, but from the inception of the equitable right upon which it is based.
[Emphasis added]".
D.

SINCE THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY HELD THAT BLUE LEDGE MET ITS
BURDEN, WHEN IT NEITHER ADDUCED SUFFICIENT UNCONTROVERTED
EVIDENCE TO PREVAIL NOR SHOWING ENTITLEMENT AS A MATTER OF FEDERAL
LAW, THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED.

Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court did not apply the correct
procedural summary judgment burden on Blue Ledge as set forth in Orvis, supra. A
summary judgment movant on its own claim has an "affirmative duty to provide the
court with facts that demonstrate both that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law and that there are no material issues of fact that would require resolution at trial."
2008 UT 2,1J19, 117 P.3d at 605. It cannot be fairly said that Blue Ledge did that, and
the trial court should have denied the summary judgment motion on Blue Ledge's claim.
II.

43 U.S.C. § 1166

BARS BLUE LEDGE'S ATTACK OF THE CLARK PATENT.

The trial court concluded that Blue Ledge could "collaterally] attack" the Clark
Patent but Gillmor could not assert a statute of limitations defense. See Section IV.B.,
supra. These legal conclusions, which appellant challenges, infra., appear to have
been based on the trial court's antecedent incorrect finding that the Land Office
conveyed nothing to Ms. Clark in 1930 contrary to the presumption to which the Clark
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patent was entitled and contrary to the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.4
A.

IF THE CLEGG PATENT CONVEYED ANYTHING, CLEGG AND BLUE LEDGE
ARE SUCCESSORS OF THE UNITED STATES AND GILLMOR CAN ASSERT
43 U.S.C. § 1166 AGAINST BLUE LEDGE.

The trial court noted correctly that 43 U.S.C. § 1166 "applies only to the United
States or its successors." See Section IV.B., supra, (emphasis added). Appellant
respectfully submits that the trial court then erred in ruling that the statute "is not
applicable here." Id. Under 43 U.S.C. § 1166, "suits by the United States to vacate and
annul any patent shall only be brought within six years after the date of the issuance of
such patents." LexisNexis 2008.
In Wollan v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 997 F.Supp. 1397 (D.Colo. 1998), plaintiff
Wollan sought a determination that he had a valid claim of right to acreage based on a
mining claim that dated back to 1890 and asserted his claimed interest had priority over
claims of others who had acquired title pursuant to a patent issued in 1986. Id. at 13991400. The federal trial court ruled that the action was barred by the federal six-year
statute of limitations, because it commenced 11 years after the 1986 patent. Id. at
1401-1402. "Because only the government may contest and seek the cancellation

4

"Despite the language of the 1872 Mining Act that claimants 'shall have the
exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all [the] surface,' courts have limited
those rights to uses reasonably related to mining operations" U.S. v. Good, 257 F.
Supp.2d 1306, 1309 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Col., 2003)(internal citations omitted); see also U.S.
v Etcheverry, supra. 230 F.2d at 195. Blue Ledge does not even claim in this case to
be the successor in interest to the mining estate associated with the Clegg Patent. Its
claim is limited to the surface estate in the disputed property. However, as Gillmor
believes it must have been , the Land Office conveyed the surface estate in 1930 to Ms.
Clark with reservation of mineral rights. The Land Office had conveyed to Mr. Clegg in
1929 those mineral rights which had been reserved out from Ms. Clark's first in time
homestead patent entry and application filed back in 1917. If this is correct, Blue
Ledge's claim in this case is to nothing at all.
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of an issued patent, § 1166 applies with equal force when a third party stands in the
shoes of the federal government to compel the vacatur or annulment of a patent." Id. at
1401 (emphasis added). "Once the six-year statute of limitations for challenging a
patent specified in 43 U.S.C. § 1166 expire[d], the patent [had] become[ ]
unassailable." Id. at 1401-1402.
Any action to challenge and seek annulment of the Clark Patent, brought by the
United States or a third party like Blue Ledge, had to be filed no later than December
20, 1936. Blue Ledge's suit was commenced more than seventy years after that date.
Assuming the Clegg Patent conveyed something to Mr. Clegg, Mr. Clegg was plainly a
successor in ownership to the United States. Blue Ledge's quiet title claim in this case is
based entirely on itself being successor in interest to Mr. Clegg. Therefore, logically, Blue
Ledge- like Mr. Clegg many years ago- is a successor to the United States if the Clegg
Patent conveyed something. Mr. Clegg many years ago stood in the shoes of the federal
government. Blue Ledge today stands in the shoes of the federal government and is
subject to the statutory limitations of actions defense.
After the Clark Patent issued, Mr. Clegg did not file an action to annul it within six
years, or at all. This undisputed fact is enhanced by a second one: back in the 1920's
and 1930's, Mr. Clegg knew of Ms. Clark's claim to the land, protested her patent
application and still did nothing after it issued. Blue Ledge not only stands in the shoes of
the federal government. It stands in the shoes of Mr. Clegg, and Mr. Clegg stood still
when the Land Office issued the Clark Patent. The trial court should have found the Blue
Ledge suit barred by 43 U.S.C. § 1166 because of when it was filed.
///
///
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B.

A RULING THAT THE CLARK PATENT CONVEYED NOTHING, OR ISSUED
ERRONEOUSLY, DOES NOT PREVENT GILLMOR FROM ASSERTING 43
U.S.C. § 1166 AGAINST BLUE LEDGE.

At the 2005 summary judgment hearing, counsel for Gillmor reminded the trial
court of the legal presumption that the Land Office conducted its activities properly and
issued the close in time Clegg and Clark Patents in harmony with each other. R
000426 at 17-18. However, even in the very unlikely event that the Land Office did not
have anything to dispose of when it issued the Clark Patent, Blue Ledge's quiet title
claim seeking its annulment still gets hung up on 43 U.S.C. § 1166.
At that hearing, counsel also raised the case of Dept. of Transportation & Public
Facilities v. First National Bank, 689 P.2d 483 (Alaska 1984). In that case, even though
the subject patent had issued improperly, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed that
Alaska stood in the shoes of the federal government for purposes of a suit that was
effectively seeking to annul a patent. Id. at 486 n. 13. The state was "estopped to deny
validity" of the patent because the six-year statute had run. Id.
The trial court concluded on November 8, 2005, that the Clark Patent was void
ab initio. This led to the trial court's conclusion that 43 U.S.C. § 1166 "is not applicable
here." In other words, because the Court ruled that Gillmor got nothing she was not a
successor in ownership to the United States, and therefore she could not stand in the
shoes of the United States to assert the statute against Blue Ledge. However, even
where a patent is void ab initio, 43 U.S.C. § 1166 prevents any challenge to the validity
of the patent once the six-year limitations period has expired. The United States
Supreme Court has stated:
"It is said that the instrument was void and hence was no patent But
the statute presupposes an instrument that might be declared void.
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When it refers to 'any patent heretofore issued,' it describes the
purport and source of the document, not its legal effect If the act
were confined to valid patents it would be almost or quite without
use. In form the statute only bars suits to annul the patent. But statutes
of limitation, with regard to land, at least, which cannot escape from
the jurisdiction, generally are held to affect the right, even if in terms
only directed against the remedy. This statute must be taken to mean
that the patent is to be held good and is to have the same effect against
the United States that it would have had if it had been valid in the first
place.
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447, 450 (1908)
(emphasis added)(internal citations omitted); see also, State of Louisiana v. Garfield,
211 U.S. 70, 77 (1908) (citing with approval United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co. where "it was decided that this act applied to patents even if void because of
a previous reservation of the land, and it was said that the statute not merely took away
the remedy but validated the patent").
C.

APPLICATION O F 43 U.S.C. § 1166 To BLUE LEDGE'S CLAIM Is
CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF REPOSE IN STATUTES O F
LIMITATIONS.

"Statutes of limitations are not designed exclusively for the benefit of individuals
but are also for the public good. These statutes of repose are intended to prevent the
revival and enforcement of stale demands; against which it may be difficult to defend,
because of lapse of time, fading of memory, and possible loss of documents." Hirtler v.
Hirtler, 566 P.2d 1231, 1231 (Utah 1977). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court
stated long ago:
"The defense of the statute of limitations is not a technical defense but
substantial and meritorious. The great weight of modern authority is to this
effect. . . . Such statutes are not only statutes of repose, but they supply
the place of evidence lost or impaired by lapse of time by raising a
presumption which renders proof unnecessary. . . . Statutes of limitation
are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in the law. They are
found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence. They
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promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs. An
important public policy lies at their foundation. They stimulate to activity
and punish negligence. While time is constantly destroying the evidence
of rights, they supply its place by a presumption which renders proof
unnecessary. Mere delay, extending to the limit prescribed, is itself a
conclusive bar. The bane and antidote go together. . . . They are founded
upon the general experience of mankind that claims, which are valid, are
not usually allowed to remain neglected. The lapse of years without any
attempt to enforce a demand creates, therefore, a presumption against its
original validity, or that it has ceased to subsist. This presumption is made
by these statutes a positive bar; and they thus become statutes of repose,
protecting parties from the prosecution of stale claims, when, by loss of
evidence from death of some witnesses, and the imperfect recollection of
others, or the destruction of documents, it might be impossible to
establish the truth."
United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1922) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
The Clark Patent issued in 1930. The reasonable inference is that it issued in
harmony with the 1929 Clegg Patent. That is probably why Mr. Clegg never instituted
an annulment action. After all, he had protested the original Clark patent application.
Blue Ledge is the first to challenge the Clark Patent, yet Blue Ledge "does not know
what happened." R. 628 at 23. It may be impossible for Blue Ledge to obtain witness
testimony or records explaining what happened between the end of the protest and the
issuance of the Clark Patent. Yet, appellant strenuously disagrees with the trial court
that there is "no possible benefit in making a factual determination about the incidents
of that day [and] [njothing could be provided that is meaningful, in the court's mind, to
the events of that day and why things happened as they did." See Section IV.C, supra.
Not only should summary judgment have been denied on Blue Ledge's counterclaim,
Blue Ledge's failure to be able to locate the salient facts from the past demonstrates
the type of prejudice that repose in a statute of limitations seeks to avoid. Accordingly,
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43 U.S. C. § 1166 should bar Blue Ledge's attempt to annul and cancel the Clark
Patent. In sum, there is no legitimate basis on which Blue Ledge can assail and
invalidate the Clairk Patent, but there is an applicable statutory bar to Blue Ledge's
claim which Gillmor can properly assert. This court should reverse the trial court's
contrary conclusions and remand.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT UNJUSTLY REWARDED BLUE LEDGE FOR ITS DELAY IN
SEEKING A FINAL JUDGMENT WHILE SUBJECTING GILLMOR TO A PENALTY FOR
THE SAME DELAY BY DISMISSING GILLMOR'S ADVERSE POSSESSION CLAIM.

After the trial court's 2005 denial of summary judgment on the adverse possession
claim and grant of partial summary judgment on the quiet title counterclaim, neither party
took any action to move the case toward a final judgment. Ultimately, Gillmor broached
the topic of settlement with Blue Ledge in September 2007 and notified Blue Ledge that
she would move the case forward if there were no settlement Ex. A to R. 595-602.
Blue Ledge's response was to turn Gillmor's stated intent to move the case forward into
an opportunity to divert attention from its own failure to move the case toward final
judgment. Despite the fact that Blue Ledge had obtained no final judgment on its
affirmative claims and had allowed them to languish, Blue Ledge moved for dismissal
with prejudice of Gillmor's adverse possession claim, alone. Gillmor therefore both filed
her motion to revisit and certified the action as ready for trial. R. 461-462.
In October 2007, Blue Ledge moved to dismiss Gillmor's adverse possession
claim for failure to prosecute. On December 5, 2007, when the trial court heard Blue
Ledge's motion to dismiss, it asked counsel for Blue Ledge to explain its own inaction
and counsel's response was "we done [sic] everything we could to prosecute our
claim, and we were done." R. 628 at 24. On December 7, 2007, the trial court granted
Blue Ledge's motion. R 550-552. On December 14, 2007, Blue Ledge submitted a
24

proposed form of order to which Gillmor objected on December 24, 2007, because the
proposed order purported that the Court granted Blue Ledge affirmative relief for which it
had not moved, wz., entry of a decree/judgment quieting title in specifically described real
property. R. 566-570 & 555-557. On December 31, 2007, the trial court ruled that it
would not sign Blue Ledge's proposed order:
"The Court agrees with plaintiff that the proposed order grants more relief than the
Court's intended order which simply dismissed plaintiffs claims for failure to
prosecute. The Court will not execute the proposed order."
R. 563.
Only then, after that message from and statement of the trial court, did Blue
Ledge move, on January 7, 2008, for entry of a final judgment and an order with a legal
description of the disputed property. R. 573-575. Blue Ledge thus waited twenty six
months, more than two years after the trial court's summary judgment ruling, to
seek the affirmative relief it wanted on its counterclaim. All along, it knew had to do
something to complete its case. It did nothing but point a finger at Gillmor's delay when
she raised the possibility of settlement. Then, in being heard on its motion to dismiss
Gillmor's remaining claim for her failure to prosecute, Blue Ledge told the trial court it
had nothing else to do on its counterclaim, when it actually did.
Parties to a lawsuit have equal obligations to move their affirmative claims
forward. However, the trial court dismissed Gillmor's claim for delay though she had
certified it ready for trial. Blue Ledge had done nothing for an even longer period of
time on its counterclaim and was awarded dismissal of Gillmor's claim and a final
judgment on its own. "Whether delay is a ground for the dismissal of an action is to be
determined on the totality of the circumstances. This includes the conduct of both
parties and the opportunity each has had to move the case forward if they so desired]
25

and also what, if any, difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other party by
the delay; and most important, whether it appears that any injustice has resulted."
Department of Social Servs. v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980)(citing
cases)(emphasis added); see also, Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d
389, 393, 335 P.2d 624 (1959). The Utah Supreme Court in Crystal Lime was faced
with a case wherein both parties were seeking to quiet title and had done nothing in the
case for eight years when the counterclaimant filed a motion to dismiss:
"Respondents' contentions might be very persuasive if they had not filed
counterclaims in the action asking that title be quieted in them and also asking
that in the event title was not quieted in them that appellant herein be required to
reimburse them the amounts they expended for taxes. In asking for such
affirmative relief they were in effect cross-complainants in the action. . . Since
any party to this action could have obtained the relief to which it was
entitled at any time it had wanted but both parties chose to dally for a
number of years, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to grant
respondents' motion to dismiss with prejudice.11
335 P.2d at 626 (emphasis added). In Romero, as in Crystal Lime, the state high court
did not reward the moving party when they had delayed as well: "we are not impressed
with either fairness or propriety in one party sitting silently by for a long period of time,
then attempting to blame the other party for the delay." 609 P.2d at 1325.
Blue Ledge has been every bit as dilatory in pursuing final resolution of its
counterclaim as Gillmor in pursuing her remaining claim. Had Gillmor not broached
settlement in September 2007, Blue Ledge would undoubtedly still be doing nothing to
move its counterclaim to final resolution or to try and terminate Gillmor's adverse
possession claim one way or another if that was what was standing in its way. Gillmor
has not caused Blue Ledge any delay. Further, Gillmor is the party who certified that
claim ready for trial. If at any time, between the 2005 summary judgment ruling and
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Gillmor's filing of the trial readiness certificate in October 2007, Blue Ledge had been
earnest about needing a court order with a legal description of the disputed property to
accompany the quiet title ruling in its favor, it could have and would have sought one.
Nothing was ever stopping it from doing so. Additionally, if Blue Ledge was sincere that
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) presented it with a procedural problem and the
adverse possession claim was "the only thing stopping [it] from getting [a] final
judgment," then Blue Ledge would have asked for a trial date to force the issue and
dispose of the rest of the case. R. 663 at 9. Those are the steps that Blue Ledge
would have taken had it wanted to try and obtain a prompt final judgment. Instead,
Blue Ledge sat on its hands for over two years and would still be doing so had Gillmor
not acted.
In sum, the trial court declined to dismiss Blue Ledge's counterclaim in light of its
inaction but dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute Gillmor's claim that she
had certified for trial. Taken together, these decisions of the trial court are inconsistent.
One of them does not tolerate delay. One of them does. In that respect, they are
fundamentally unfair and constitute an abuse of discretion. Justice requires that this
Court set aside the dismissal of Gillmor's adverse possession claim and remand it for
trial.
///
///
///
///
///
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Appellees respectfully requests that the judgment
of the trial court be reversed, in its entirety.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this 20th day of October, 2008.

PETERS SCOFIELD

A Professional Corporation

DAVID \A[. SCCDFIELC
R. REED PRUTN GO¥.DSTEI{

Attorneys for the Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing Opening Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, this OOj^ay of
October, 2008, to the following:
Rosemary J. Beless
FABIAN & CLENDENIN

215 South State Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
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Rosemary J. Beless, A0272
P. Bruce Badger, A4791
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Blue Ledge Corporation
Twelfth Floor, 215 South State Street
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801)531-8900
Facsimile: (801) 532-3370
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NADINE GXLLMOR,
Plaintiff,
FINAL JUDGMENT
v.
UNITED PARK CITY MINES, a Utah
corporation, BLUE LEDGE
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
SUSAN A. MEGUR, STEVE MEGUR,
JOHN J. CUMMINGS, SUSAN S.
CUMMINGS, EREMALOS
DEVELOPMENT, THE ESTATE OF
CHARLES F. GJXLMOR, and ALL
OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING ANY
RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST ADVERSE
TO THE INTERESTS OF THE
PLAINTIFF,

Civil No. 94-060-0087QT
Judge Bruce Lubeck

Defendants.
BLUE LEDGE CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation,
Counter-claimant,

U iod45

V.

NADINE GILLMOR, and ALL
UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO CLAIM
ANY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE ACTION,

)
)
)
)

Counter-defendants.
)

On November 8, 2005, the court granted defendant Blue Ledge Corporation's
motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim quieting title in Blue Ledge Coiporation to the
following described real property, and the court having now dismissed all other claims in this
action, now enters i1s final judgment.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
Defendant Blue Ledge Corporation is the sole and exclusive owner of the
following real property, Blue Ledge Corporation is entitled to the quiet and peaceful possession
of the following real property, and neither plaintiff Nadine Gillmor nor any other person has any
estate, right, title, lien or interest in or to the following real property:
The surface estate of those portions of the Woodrow
No. 6, Clegg No. 2, and the Clegg No. 3 patented
mining claims, situated in the Northwest Quarter of
Section 11, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, SLB&M,
Summit County, Utah.

o> u ii d!fcH

2

DATED this

U

day of

Honorable Bruce Lubeck
District Court Judge

ND: 4846-2412-1346, Ver 1
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3

TabB

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NADINE GILLMOR,
RULING and ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case No. 940600087
vs.
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
UNITED PARK CITY MINES, et.al.,
Defendants.
DATE: December 31, 2007
The above matter came before the court for decision on Blue
Ledge's request to submit concerning a proposed order.
issued a Ruling and Order December 7, 2007.

The court

That remains the

final order of the court and as indicated therein no further
order is required.

The court agrees with plaintiff that the

proposed order grants more relief than the court's intended order
which simply dismissed plaintiff's claims for failure to
prosecute. The court will not execute the proposed order.
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
order is required.

JAN - 4 V™

DATED t h i s

H

day of

, 2007.
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BRUCE C. LUB
DISTRICT COUR'
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PARK CITY COUNTRY CLUB ESTATES,
et al. ,
Plaintiffs,

RULING and ORDER
Case No. 940600087 PR

y

Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
UNITED PARK CITY MINES, et al.,
Defendants.

DATE: December 7, 2007

This matter came before the Court on December 5, 2007
for oral arguments on defendant Blue Ledge's motion to dismiss
for failure to prosecute.

Blue Ledge filed its motion to dismiss October 9, 2007,
plaintiff opposed it October 25, 2007, and Blue Ledge replied in
support on November 5, 2007.

At the eleventh hour, on December 3, 2007, the court
received plaintiff Gillmor's (Gillmor) request to submit on a
motion to reconsider.

Gillmor filed her motion to reconsider the

court's 2005 grant of summary judgment on October 25, 2007. Blue
Ledge filed an opposition November 13, 2007. Gillmor replied and
-1-

EXHIBITA

requested to submit for decision on December 3, 2007. Plaintiff
asked that the court consider this motions with the previously
scheduled motion to dismiss. On the day prior to oral arguments,
defendant submitted a motion for and a proposed surreply.

Although the court would not normally consider such a
request to hold oral arguments on such short notice, because the
motion is integral to the motion to dismiss and the court wishes
to proceed in this case given the inordinate prior delays the
court permitted the parties to argue both motions at oral
arguments.

Plaintiff Gillmor was present through Ronald F. Price and
Blue Ledge was present through Rosemary J. Beless and P. Bruce
Badger. Before the hearing the court considered the memoranda and
other materials submitted by the parties and after the hearing,
the court took the issues under advisement. Since taking the
issues under advisement, the court has further and more carefully
those materials and considered the law and facts relating to the
issues.

Now being fully advised, the court renders the following

Ruling and Order.
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MOTION TO RECONSIDER
In the thirteen years that have elapsed since Gillmor filed
her complaint the following has occurred: the court ordered
plaintiff to prosecute her case on four prior occasions;
plaintiff filed three amended complaints; Blue Ledge asserted a
counterclaim to quiet title in August 1995, which the court
granted summary judgment on in November 2005. Plaintiff now
requests this court reconsider that grant of summary judgment
entered two years ago.
"Trial courts have clear discretion to reconsider and change
their position with respect to any orders or decisions as long as
no final judgment has been rendered." Brookside
v. Peebles,

Mobile

Home Park

2002 UT 48, 3118 (citations omitted). Nonetheless,

although courts generally discourage motions to reconsider

"they

have become the cheatgrass of the litigation landscape. . . .
[T]he extraordinary circumstance may arise when it is appropriate
to request a trial court to reconsider a ruling. These occasions
are rare." Shipman v. Evans,

2004 UT 44, 118.

Such circumstances

may arise when:
(1) [T]he matter is presented in a 'different light' or
under 'different circumstances;' (2) there has been a
-3-

change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new
evidence; (4) ^manifest injustice' will result if the
court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court
needs to correct its own errors; or (6) an issue was
inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the
court.
Trembly

v.

Mrs.

Fields

Cookies,

884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (UT App.

1994(citation omitted). At a minimum for a court to properly
consider a motion to reconsider a grant of summary judgment a
question of fact must exist. Brookside,

f 18.

In 2005 the court determined there was no dispute of
material fact on the issue of Blue Ledge's patent: "the court
finds no factual disputes that are material and judgment should
be granted as a matter of law to defendant." The court also noted
"The statute of limitations applies only to the United States or
its successors, and is not applicable here."
Plaintiff brought a "Motion to Revisit the Court's Ruling
That Defendant Blue Ledge Corporation is Entitled to Summary
Judgment on the Issue of Whether its Claim is Barred by the
Applicable Federal Statute of Limitations." Gillmor requests the
court reconsider summary judgment because Gillmor believes the
court's conclusion on this single issue "is erroneous as a matter
of law." Gillmor does not contest any other issue involved in the
court's 2005 decision but Gillmor does attempt to introduce facts
-4-

that now create a factual dispute.
The court expected plaintiff to draw its attention to some
change in law or evidence or circumstances that would have
rendered this conclusion of law in doubt. Plaintiff has done no
such thing nor does plaintiff dispute this. Rather, the court
discovered that plaintiff has only reiterated the arguments she
made and lost on two years ago. She specifically states "as set
forth in plaintiff's memorandum opposing Blue Ledge's motion for
summary judgment" and Gillmor then proceeds to again set forth
and elaborate on her same arguments that did not prevail two full
years ago.
In 2005 the portion of plaintiff's motion related to the
statute of limitations was slightly more than a page long. That
page of the 2005 argument included the same citation to the case
she elaborates on now. The 2007 motion differs only in length,
which derives from an extended discussion of this and other cases
all of which had been decided in 2005 on the application of the
statute of limitations. These cases and arguments were clearly
available to plaintiff two years ago.
Although plaintiff titles her motion as one to reconsider
the application of the statute of limitations she also attempts
to reargue that the 1930 patent is not void. She reargues this
claim with reference to cases that were available to her, but
which she chose not to apply, when she opposed summary judgment
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in 2005. The court believes that the cases relied on did not and
do not support plaintiff's arguments.
No case cited by plaintiff nor any of her reiterated
arguments give the court reason to reconsider its conclusion of
law. The court stands by its determination that "[t]he 1929
patent makes any further attempts at conveyance, or any later
patents of the same or a different kind, void ab initio." This
meant the United States did not have title to convey in 1930, and
thus that the statute of limitations is inapplicable to
plaintiff's claims. Absent any sound reason to reconsider the
court's determination on the effect of the 1929 conveyance, the
court sees no justification to reconsider its conclusion of law
that the statute of limitations does not apply.
In the surreply Blue Ledge makes clear, with the
attachments, that there was and is no factual dispute concerning
the issuance of the Clegg patent in 1929.

It is beyond factual

dispute that Blue Ledge's predecessor received patent title
before Gillmor's predecessor and a genuine issue of material fact
is not created by the claimed "protest" documents of Gillmor's
predecessor.
Plaintiff may, with 20/20 hindsight, wish she had made
different arguments two years ago, but a motion to reconsider is
not the proper place to argue what a party wishes they had
argued, particularly when the cases do not support those
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arguments. Simple discontent with a court's adverse conclusion of
law does not entitle a party to have the court revisit it. If
that were so the court would be deluged with such requests as one
party almost always believes the court has misperceived the law.
The court rejects plaintiff's motion to reconsider its grant of
summary judgment both procedurally and on the merits. Again,
this motion was filed over 23 months after the prior November 8,
2005, ruling.
The court notes, given Utah courts' well-established
disfavor of motions to reconsider, plaintiff would have been
better advised to spend her efforts prosecuting the remaining
adverse possession claim in this case, or making a timely 60(b)
request or seeking permission for an interlocutory appeal. That
she did not, and that she relies on cases and arguments available
to her in 2005, is material to the court's ruling on defendant's
motion to dismiss as well in denying this motion to reconsider.

MOTION TO DISMISS
Blue Ledge requests the court dismiss the action brought by
plaintiff for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff objects to Blue
Ledge's motion, arguing that when parties have asserted
counterclaims, they too are responsible to prosecute the case.
Defendant asserts that although plaintiff has filed notices
of depositions, no depositions have actually occurred. In fact no
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discovery has occurred since 1995. This lack of depositions or
other discovery bolsters the court's belief that there is no new
reason it should reconsider the prior grant of summary judgment.
The fact that plaintiff filed her 54(b) motion does not
demonstrate to the court that plaintiff is prosecuting her claims
with due diligence. Instead, it looks like another attempt to
avoid actually prosecuting her claims. Gillmor filed a
certificate of readiness in conjunction with the motion to
reconsider and the court fails completely to understand why that
claim was not certified as ready for trial immediately after the
November 2005 ruling.

Blue Ledge had prevailed on its only claim

and had no reason to pursue anything as it had no claim to
pursue.
"When a 'trial court has provided plaintiffs 'an opportunity
to be heard and to do justice, f and that plaintiff abuses its
opportunity through inexcusable neglect, the trial court does not
abuse its discretion in dismissing the case/" Country
Convalescent
Fin.,

Ctr. v. Department

of Health,

Div.

Meadows

of Health

Care

851 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
When the court considers the thirteen years that have

elapsed; the ample opportunity plaintiff has had to move this
case forward, most especially since November 2005 when nothing
was done at all until at least September 2007 when Gillmor
asserts settlement negotiations began; her lack of action overall

-8-

in the case concerning discovery; that most of plaintiffs steps
to prosecute her case have generally been in response to a court
order or a motion requiring her to do so; that Blue Ledge has had
its counterclaims granted and has nothing left to pursue and that
the court has determined it will not reconsider that grant of
summary judgment; that Blue Ledge has waited thirteen years to
develop its land, the court is lead to the conclusion that the
only injustice that would result would be in not dismissing this
case.
Blue Ledge's motion to dismiss with prejudice is GRANTED.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
order is required.

DATED this

/

day of December, 2007.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NADINE GILMOR,
RULING and ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case No. 940300087
vs.
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK
UNITED PARK CITY MINES, BLUE
LEDGE CORPORATION, SUSAN A.
MEGUR, STEVE MEGUR, JOHN J.
CUMMINGS, SUSAN S. CUMMINGS,
EREMALOS DEVELOPMENT, THE
ESTATE OF CHARLES F. GILLMOR,
et.al.,

DATE: November 8, 2005

Defendants.
BLUE LEDGE CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant,
v.
NADINE GILMOR, et.al.,
Counterdefendants
The above matter came before the court on November 7, 2005,
for oral argument on Blue Ledge's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff was present with David W. Scofield and Thomas W.
Peters, United Park City Mines and Blue Ledge were present
through Rosemary J. Beless and P. Bruce Badger.
this motion on February 25, 2005.

Blue Ledge filed

Plaintiff filed an opposition

response on April 5, 2005. Blue Ledge filed a reply on May 6,
2005.
2005.

A notice to submit was filed by Plaintiff on May 19,
Oral argument was scheduled and postponed by the parties

\y\

and eventually held November 7, 2005. The court took the matter
under advisement.

The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and
heard oral argument, and concludes as follows.

ARGUMENTS
Blue Ledge (Defendant) moved for summary judgment quieting
title and declaring plaintiff has failed to prove adverse
possession.
In March, 1996, a settlement and dismissal was entered
dismissing all plaintiff's claims against all but this defendant
Blue Ledge and there remains at issue plaintiff7 s adverse
possession claim against Blue Ledge and Blue Ledge's counterclaim
seeking to quiet title to the same real property-

Plaintiff

filed a motion for summary judgment in 1996 on those issues but
withdrew it later that year.

Defendant claims in 1999 plaintiff

deeded her right in the property to another, but in 2004 she
received her claim back and now retains her status as a party in
interest.
The issue is who owns what defendant calls the Clegg and
Woodrow Mining Claims or Patented claims or Clegg Patents.
Defendant asserts fee title went from the United States to United
Park City Mines (UPCM) in 1929, and in 1930 the United States

-2-

issued a homestead (or grazing) patent for property to Johanna
Clark, predecessor of plaintiff, which should have excluded the
patented claims since the former were patented on May 22, 1929.
In 1994, UPCM, and then this defendant, included the Clegg
Patented claims in a proposed subdivision being developed.
Plaintiff then filed this action to quiet title in the Patented
claims or for declaratory judgment plaintiff owned the Patented
Claims by adverse possession. On May 25, 1995, UPMC transferred
title to the surface estate of the Patented Claims to Blue Ledge,
and only the surface estate of the Patented Claims is at issue.
Defendant claims as undisputed facts that the property at
issue is a portion of the surface estate of the Patented Claims
situated in the Northwest Quarter of Section 11, Township 2,
South, Range 4 East, SLB&M.

Fee title, including both surface

and mineral estates, was conveyed from the United States to
Charles L. Clegg, predecessor of UPCM and Blue Ledge, by patent
dated May 22, 1929.

On December 20, 1930, the United States

issues a homestead patent to Johanna A. Clark, covering 479 acres
and including some of the same area as the previous Clegg
patents.

Those Clark patents included the Patented Claims or

Clegg patent.

Those Clegg Patents are shown on a Supplemental

Plan recorded August 7, 1935.
the Clark Patent.

Plaintiff claims ownership through

Clegg, on July 26, 1929, conveyed fee title to

Silver King by Mining Deed, recorded August 1, 1929. On March 16,

-3-

1983, Silver King conveyed fee title to UPCM, who on May 25,
1995, transferred title to the surface estate of the Patented
Claims to Blue Ledge, but UPCM retained the mineral estate in a
Special Warranty Deed recorded June 2, 1995. On August 19, 1982,
this court quieted title in UPCM to the Clegg Patent, which was
affirmed on appeal.

UPCM v. Clegg, 737 P.2d 173 (Utah 1987).

UPCM has used the property from 1982.

Beginning in 1991, UPCM,

now Blue Ledge as successor, have been designing and developing
the Hidden Meadows Subdivision, which encompassed the Clegg
Patent.

Those efforts include road construction and curb and

gutter, sewer, phone and power lines, and the Clegg Patents are
now prepared for residential development as part of that
subdivision.
Blue Ledge argues it holds paramount record title and so
title should be quieted in its favor. Blue Ledge must prevail on
the strength of its own claim, not the weakness of plaintiff s
claim. Where both parties claim title through different chains,
each must prove its right to title. To quiet title one must show
a claim of title which entitles the party to possession and that
the interest claimed by others is adverse or hostile to the
alleged claim of title or interest.
Priority of time governs competing interests according to
defendant, and the highest evidence of title is that from the
United States in a patent.

Defendant claims it has shown prima
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facie evidence of title and thus the burden is on plaintiff to
controvert the evidence of title. The United States could not
convey to Clark in 1930 any rights by a grazing or homestead
patent, as the United States no longer held and could not cut off
existing vested rights held by the owner of the 1929 Patented
Claims, the Clegg Patents. Plaintiff clearly has claimed an
interest that is hostile to that of Blue Ledge.
Plaintiff is claimed to have failed in her efforts to show
adverse possession also.

To prove that claim, plaintiff must

have paid all taxes on the property and be in actual, open,
notorious and exclusive possession of the property for seven
continuous years.

Plaintiff must strictly comply with those

elements and it is argued she cannot prove them.
Plaintiff has not been in actual possession as she claims.
There must be actual occupation under such circumstances that the
owner, or a person of ordinary prudence, would know, that the
land was being held by another.

Thus, plaintiff's claim of

leasing the property to a third party for grazing is not
sufficient.

Use of property outside the Clegg Patents is not

sufficient either.
Plaintiff has not given notice of adverse possession, and if
grazing is claimed as the use, the owner must have actual notice.
Plaintiff did not improve the land or give notice in that manner
of her claimed occupation, even though that opportunity was
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available.
Plaintiff's use was not exclusive as against the title
holder, it did not operate as an ouster of the true owner, and it
was not continuous for seven years. If the claim is based on
grazing, the grazing must be continuous through the grazing
season and period for the entire seven years. UPCM used ,the
property as a parachute drop for the U.S. Air Force, weekly
mountain bike trails, tours, and for production of a television
commercial.

From 1991 to 1996 the property was used by UPCM as

part of the designed subdivision, thus plaintiff has not ousted
the true owner.
Plaintiff must also show, according to defendant, that the
use must be for its ordinary use, and this land is not suitable
for sheep grazing.

This land is not pasture, but hilly sage and

oak covered land.
The affidavits attached show that from 1991, one of the
developers of the subdivision has not seen livestock grazing on
the property and that work on the subdivision has been ongoing
since 1995. In 1983 UPCM entered into agreements with the U.S.
Air Force to allow the property to be used as a drop zone for
parachutists.

Touring and bike competitions were held and a

television commercial was filed on the property.

In opposition, plaintiff disputes several facts relied on by
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defendant, as well as the meaning, or interpretation, of some
facts that are not disputed.

Plaintiff asserts that the United

States conveyance to Clegg was for the mining estate and not the
surface estate.

Plaintiff disputes that Clegg conveyed fee title

to Silver King, and thus disputes the 1973 conveyance to UPCM and
the UPCM conveyance to Blue Ledge, again claiming that the
surface estate was not conveyed. Plaintiff disputes any
significance of the Utah Supreme Court case of UPCM v. Clegg, as
plaintiff was not a party and no claims of plaintiffs ownership
were adjudicated in that case. Plaintiff also contests and
disputes that the land at issue was used by UPCM for various
purposes, though plaintiff does not deny agreements existed for
such, and asserts the only use of the land was by plaintiff or
her lessees.
Plaintiff claims that the federal statute, 43 USC 1166,
requires challenges to Homestead Patents be made within 6 years,
which patent was granted in the 1930s.
Plaintiff also contends her use of the land has been
consistent with her patent, and defendant is not using the land
consistent with the mining patent defendant claims.

Because

plaintiff is using the land consistent with her homestead patent,
and defendant is not using the land consistent with a mining
patent, plaintiff's title is superior.
Plaintiff also argues that the patent issued by the United
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states cannot Joe attacked by a third party. The grazing or
homestead patent is superior title which is clear evidence of
title. Plaintiff argues it must be presumed the United States was
correct in issuing a Homestead Patent a year after a Mining
Patent.

Thus, the prior patent does not make it superior to the

later patent. The subject matter of the two patents is different.
As to the adverse possession claim of plaintiff, plaintiff
claims there are genuine issues of material fact. The Utah
statutes on adverse possession require certain factors to be
present and plaintiff alleges there are disputes about whether
some of those factors are present.
Plaintiff claims title under a written instrument.
Plaintiff claims there was continuous possession from not
only 1987, but from 1983, through 1994.

Unenclosed property is

considered occupied and possessed if used for pasturage or for
the ordinary use of the occupant.

This land was used by

plaintiff in the ordinary usage of grazing in the proper seasons.
Plaintiff claims the land is taxed as agricultural and so
defendant's assertion that there has never been any grazing is at
issue.
The use has also been adverse and this put defendant on
notice. Plaintiff contacted UPCM in 1983 to discuss the
"overlapping" deeds and that amounted to notice of adverse and
open use.

-5-

Plaintiff paid taxes since 1983 at least.
Affidavits and documents attached show that grazing occurred
yearly and that taxes were paid by plaintiff.

In reply, defendant again argues the United States conveyed
fee title to the predecessor of Blue Ledge in 1929. That is said
to be a matter of law discernible from the patent.

Thereafter,

the United States had no title and could not convey anything to
plaintiffs predecessor in 1930 as plaintiff claims. The land
involves portions of the surface estate of three patented mining
claims.
Defendant claims there are only two facts that matter, and
those are (l)that the 1929 conveyance precedes the conveyance
plaintiff relies on, and (2) defendant used the land while
plaintiff claims to have obtained it by adverse possession.
Defendant argues that the dispute about the 1929 patent is a
legal, not a factual dispute.

Similarly, there is no dispute

about the adverse possession claim facts, as plaintiff only
argues she did not observe UPCM use of the property, but that she
did use it. Plaintiff has not disputed that the property was used
by defendants and its predecessors.
As a matter of law, a mining patent conveys surface and
mining estates, unless the surface estate is reserved. Recording
does not matter with patents from the United States. When the
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United States patents land, subsequent attempts by the United
States to patent that same land are void, as the United States
cannot convey the land again."The second conveyance is void from
the beginning and thus plaintiff has no title.
As to adverse possession, defendant was not ousted and there
is no dispute but that defendant used the land, and plaintiff did
not exclusively use the land. While the court would like to give
a presumption of regularity to the 1930 patent, the court sees no
possible benefit in making a factual determination about the
incidents of that day.

Nothing could be provided that is

meaningful, in the court's mind, to the events of that day and
why things happened as they did.

No witnesses could shed any

light on motivation or meaning, and the court believes the 1929
patent conveys title and it is unbroken to defendant.

DISCUSSION
QUIET TITLE.
As to the motion concerning this claim of defendants, the
court finds no factual disputes that are material and judgment
should be granted as a matter of law to defendant.
The 1929 patent makes any further attempts at conveyance, or
any later patents of the same or a different kind, void ab
initio.

The statute of limitations applies only to the United

States or its successors, and is not applicable here.
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A

collateral attack on the homestead patent is allowed by
defendant.

The court sees nothing but a legal dispute about the

effect of these 1929 and 1930 patents.

ADVERSE POSSESSION.
The court believes there are factual disputes that preclude
summary judgment on that claim.
Defendant claims the period of claimed adverse possession is
from 1987 to 1994, and plaintiff cannot show ouster as from 1991
defendant has been developing the area.

However, plaintiff's

affidavit, contrary to her memorandum, asserts adverse possession
beginning in 1983, and so the adverse possession claim is "ripe"
by 1990.

Payment of taxes is not contested for purposes of this

motion, but only the "ouster" element.
The court sees genuine disputes over how long the property
was possessed by plaintiff, what the conditions of the land were,
and whether others used the property and what those uses were and
when they occurred.

While plaintiff's affidavit leaves something

to be desired as far as the degree of knowledge about other use,
the court does not believe that at this point the court can say
plaintiff has failed to create a dispute about whether others
used the property, or were "ousted" in a given period of time.
Summary judgment is not proper on this claim.
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The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to defendant's
quiet title claim and DENIED as to plaintiff's adverse possession
claim.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
order is required.
DATED this

day of

, 2005.

'/&</

BY THE-"COURT:

^

BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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